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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is provide us with empirical evidences and theoretical knowledge about how 
the compelling current Sovereign Debt Crisis in the periphery Euro-zone countries was triggered 
according with moral hazard theory, because the implicit and explicit externalization of risk cost for 
commercial financial institutions and/or banks. Different from traditional working papers that 
concentrated only on weak macroeconomic fundamentals and contagion effects as the main origins of the 
previous financial crises. In this way, this research is attempting to solve how moral hazard problem in the 
Euro-zone periphery countries after the introduction of the Euro currency as a global competitor of the 
U.S.A. Dollar caused and/or nurtured their fiscal and external unbalances. This after a short period of 
euphoria and wellbeing, with reduction of the interest rate and easily access to capital to finance 
unprofitable and risky biased businesses without appropriate banking regulation; ending up in a vicious 
circle between weak banking system and fiscal imbalances.   
After assessing thoroughly different related economic and financial statistics from the Euro-zone 
periphery countries Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS), such as ratio Short Term External 
Debt/Foreign Exchange Reserve as a moral hazard index, as well as Fiscal and External unbalances 
accounts, among others, making a comparison with some of the North-core Euro countries evolution, one 
of the first evidences is that the nowadays Sovereign Debt Crisis has been originated in the awkward circle 
between weak financial system and implicit guarantees provided by negligent governments without suitable 
public financial regulation and supervision; while politicians were differing necessary reforms as the fiscal 
union adoption in the region. All in all, future research about causes of the financial crises should be 
focused on the moral hazard problems rather that in traditional weak fundamentals; consequently, 
economy policymakers should come up with the possibility to explicitly and legally avoiding the direct and 
discretionary interventions of the Central Banks or Governments (Finance Ministers) with the aim to 
rescue or bailout broken commercial financial institutions under socialization programs of their debts. 
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“FINANCIAL CRISIS IN EURO ZONE AND MORAL HAZARD” 
 
I.- INTRODUCTION 
There are different factors that explain a financial crisis. Some researchers have been 
traditionally concentrated on Fixed/Pegged Exchange Rate and overvaluation of the local 
currency, domestic credit expansion, high and persistent deficits in the Current Account of the 
Balance of Payments and Fiscal Accounts, high stock of Public Debt. These research 
including also external shocks, such as increasing of international interest rates or falling 
down of the Terms of Trade; and contagion effect (herd behavior). However, there are other 
factors that help understand better how these financial crises can be originated. Therefore, this 
document will explore other sources of the current European Sovereign Debt Crises as Moral 
Hazard behavior of economic/financial and politic agents that allowed commercial financial 
institutions (banks) to externalize their risk cost, combined with politic crisis, government 
profligates and corruption in the so-called European zone periphery EU countries: Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain (PIIGS). 
The moral hazard is a behavior caused by asymmetric information problems in 
financial markets, where the commercial financial institutions such as banks have better/more 
information than the regulator (financial supervisor) about transactions, efforts in order to 
avoid collapses and crisis in advance or ex ante (third generation of currency crisis model). 
So, the moral hazard problem for the aim of this document has been defined as the awkward 
behavior of some economic agents and politicians in the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 
the last decade after the introduction of the Euro as a global currency. Initially, the 
introduction of this regional policy allowed them experiencing a sense of wellbeing boom for 
a short time in the early 2000s due to easy access to credits with low interest rates that have 
conducted toward an extremely hazardous indebtedness of financial institutions, taking risk 
position by increasing the Short Term Debt regarding the Foreign Exchange Reserve. All of 
them under the absence of appropriated financial regulation/supervision. Furthermore, some 
governments implicitly guaranteed some weak banks to borrow funds, allowing 
externalization of their risk cost, and also creating a compelling vicious circle with the Public 
Debt.  
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Certainly, more of the scholars have been concentrated on some disequilibrium of 
economic variables (weak fundamentals) aforementioned, but ignoring the real and original 
causes of this turmoil the moral hazard incurred ex ante by some of the financial 
stakeholders. In this way, the basic research question addressed is how has the moral hazard 
problem incurred by commercial financial institutions in the Euro-zone periphery countries in 
the last decade caused and/or nurtured the current Sovereign Debt Crisis. At the same time 
this central research question will allow understand how the introduction of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the Euro as a global currency and competitor of the U.S.A. 
Dollar by the end of 1990 years, nurtured or triggered the nowadays European Financial 
Crisis.  
The organization of this document will permit us see in the next section (II) the basic 
literature reviewing about how the moral hazard problem has been empirically presented in 
the previous financial crises in Latin America, East Asian, Russia, United States of America 
and other countries. In the third section the working paper will concentrate on the theoretic 
framework based on Asymmetric Information theory and Moral Hazard. The fourth section 
intends to assess the relationship and causality between theoretic moral hazard definition and 
the empirical financial problems in the last years in the European Monetary Union. The 
conclusions and main economic policy implications from the Euro zone Sovereign Debt 
Crisis assessment will be provided in the last section. The annex includes some public, 
domestic and external financial indicators of the Euro-zone.  
 
II.- LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section summarizes some academic researches about Financial Crisis in different 
countries, trying to emphasize moral hazard ex ante problem as the main factor that has been 
triggered financial crisis under the absence of suitable regulation of financial markets, their 
over liberalization, wrong intervention of the Central Banks, government bailouts of financial 
institutions (private and public) that create a vicious circle between them, politic instability 
and other related activities. All of them led commercial financial institutions (banks) to 
externalize the risk cost, for instance, in the cases of United States of America (2007), 
Argentina (2000), Brazil and Russia (ending of 1990s), Asia and Mexico (1997/98 and 
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1994/95 respectively) and one decade before the Latin America (Chilean) financial crisis, the 
Lost Decade (1980s).    
One of the first cases in which we can see how moral hazard have been presented is 
North American mortgage crisis under liberalization (deregulated) policies, “created not only 
by all those terrible people on Wall Street who took risks and ruined the economy because of 
they were greedy, but also by the real state bubble, playing the Central Bank a big role in its 
formation; therefore, it is necessary more formal checks and balances to prevent the Federal 
Reserve taking large risks” (Allen and Carletti, 2009). Let us not forget that this deregulation 
started in the 1980s with the Mr. Reagan’s administration, continued in the follow three 
governments of Mr. Bush (father), Mr. Clinton and Mr. Bush (child), without strict financial 
regulation and supervision, especially in financial derivatives and other new sophisticated 
financial instruments; which in turn make financing industry one of the most risky profitable 
sectors in the USA economy.  
As a result of the financial liberalization without suitable regulations as well as 
according to Peruvian economist De Soto (2011), based on the property rights theory and the 
good rule of law system, it has been very difficult to identify the owners of roughly 60 percent 
of the Real State mortgages in the USA, at the same time it has not been established a suitable 
regulation to avoid them from toxic documents
1
. Undoubtedly, the combination of both 
situations have been caused that some private banks and investors felt into moral hazard 
behavior, taking advantage under implicit government financial support (for the financial 
system) and externalization of the risk cost.  
Another case of financial crisis accompanied with politic crisis and corruption is 
Argentina. In 1989 Carlos Menem was elected President in the middle of the economic 
debacle, hyperinflation, recession and high unemployment, etc., and started structural 
adjustment program including tax reform, privatizations of public enterprises, trade and 
financial liberalization during the 1990s
2
; as well as the adoption of the Currency Board 
System enacted the Convertibility Law in 1991
3
. At the same time, one of the chronic 
problems that had been presented in Argentina was the corruption of politics and public 
                                                          
1
 De Soto, Hernando (Dec. 02, 2011). International Herald Tribune Newspaper. 
2
 According to “Washington Consensus” Recommendations. 
3
 Hornbeck, J.F. The Argentine Financial Crisis, 2002. 
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official; which in turns made the Currency Board System adopted in the 1990s does not work 
well. Different from other economies like Hong Kong, which is working well under strict 
fiscal discipline (Chiu, 2001)
4
. Furthermore, corruption restricted international loans for this 
country. Finishing the period of Menem, after financial crisis in Russian (1998) and then in 
Brazil (1999)
5
, Argentina entered in a prolonged recession by the third quarterly of 2000 and 
unemployment rate increased faster. In the middle of economic crisis Fernando de la Rua was 
elected President and got financial assistance from the Monetary International Fund (IMF). 
In October 2000 the Vice President Carlos Alvarez resigned over the La Rua´s decision 
of not replace two cabinet members linked with a Senate bribery scandal, which contributed 
to creating political instability and financial panic that led triggering the financial crisis. So, 
after approving the law for cutting budget in January 2001, the Minister of Finance Cavallo 
resigned and later the President De la Rua. Then the Congress pointed out the San Luis 
Governor Rodriguez Saa in December 2001 as interim President, and announced a new 
economic plan: a) suspension of payment on Public Debt, b) new job creation program, c) 
creation of new currency not to be convertible to U.S.$. However, the political and economic 
problems continued and the Congress chose Peronist Senator Duhalde to complete 2003 as 
President. It was announced the end of the Currency Board, its devaluation in 29 percent for 
major foreign commercial transactions, with the adoption of the Floating Exchange Rate for 
all other transactions, started the financial crisis with the collapse of financial sector 
(Hornbeck, 2002).   
The Brazilian financial crisis in 1999 showed in part how the carelessness of the 
government to regulate and supervise appropriately the baking system, after starting the 
process of liberalization with a fixed exchange rate can led toward financial problems. This 
was a result of the Real Plan implemented after Fernando Cardoso had been elected President 
in 1994 (second period), who adopted free market policies (Franco, 1995). Indeed, under 
Fixed Exchange rate the model needs capital influx to accumulate Foreign Exchange Reserves 
to defend the pegged exchange rate. This results in a high international Debt US$ 230 billon, 
the second largest in the world, with a total net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow of 
US$ 60 billion since 1994, stimulated by the liberalization and scarce regulation. The 
                                                          
4
 Chiu, Priscilla (2011). Hong Kong Experience in Operating the Currency Board System. 
5 
In January of 1999, Brazil devalued its domestic currency (Real) and damaged Argentina exports in 30 percent.
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portfolio flows during 1997 and 1998 were US$ 71 billion in, and US$ 68 billion out; as well 
as portfolio investment (mixture of equity and bond purchased)
6
. At the same time tariff 
liberalization allowed increasing imports of goods and services, increasing the Deficit in the 
Current Account (BoP), reached 4.5 percent of GDP, and high demand for U.S.$ to finance 
imports. 
Additionally, we have the economic growth in Latin American countries in the 1990s as 
a period of euphoria that led banks met credit demand from private sectors easily, supported 
by foreign capital influx, this is when banks detrimentally preferred returns over liquidity, 
maintaining low reserves and adopting more speculative posture being less carelessness. This 
also occurred before in Mexico (1994) and South Korea (1997). 
One year after triggering the financial crisis in Asia, we had the Russian Financial 
Crisis (Summer 1998), as a consequence of political uncertainty and financial liberalization 
without suitable regulation, as part of its socioeconomic and politic transformations from 
State (centrally planned economy) lead development toward private sector (market based 
decisions). The liberalization of different sectors was very difficult because these were part of 
the State structure without regulation for many years, accumulating deficiency and losing 
competitiveness (UNCTAD, 1998). Starting liberalization of the financial sector without 
appropriate regulation and weaken institutions, the private property was unfairly concentrated 
in few hands of managers, who at the same time neither have the correct incentives nor 
sufficient capital in order to deal with transformations and necessary modernizations, it has 
been clearly an example of the Agency-Principal problem. 
The straight monetary policy with high interest rate and the lack of supervision in the 
financial market, bolstered the financial crisis in this transition economy due to the fact that 
allowed a huge inflow of external capital (equities), long run and short terms capitals, as well 
as it was registered speculative financial operations under externalization of risk cost, with 
implicitly government guarantees. Moreover, the wealth of some families was the result of 
unfair (sometimes illegal activities) redistribution of the former State property but not as a 
result of entrepreneurial activities, exacerbating moral risk behavior. Furthermore, the Public 
                                                          
6
 Most of it is owed to commercial banks, mainly European. 
  http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/brazil-cn.htm 
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Sector was characterized by scarce of transparency and irregularities, developed reforms on 
Public Spend and collecting taxes. Last but not least, the heavy retirement pension fund 
deficit was one of the factors that nurtured the fiscal imbalance (UNCTAD, 1998). 
Meanwhile, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was caused not only by traditional 
macroeconomic disequilibrium factors and weak fundamentals (Zhuang and Dowling, 2002), 
but also by Moral Hazard problems (Third Generation of Currency Crisis Model), as well as 
political uncertainty under changes in governments
7
, political transitions and deregulation of 
the financial system. Therefore, there was presented high indebtedness implicitly supported 
by governments that helped triggered the financial crises; private investors got financial funds 
to invest without suitable supervision in unsustainable sectors (Radelt and Sachs, 1998). 
Furthermore, these financial institutions increased awkward business activities used a 
mismatched maturity method: borrowing from international markets on a short-term basis and 
investing in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) markets on a long-term basis 
(Kyong ju Kim, 2006), for example, in Thailand and Indonesia. 
High levels of capital inflows, especially of short-terms borrowings in the 1990s 
(Cipollini and Capetanios, 2006), place new pressures on underdeveloped and lack of 
technical supervision on financial system, commercial banks and Central Banks, institutional 
changes generally cannot keep pace with the high level of the international flows; which in 
turn generates ample conditions for excessive risk taking, poor banking judgment, and even 
outright frauds
8
. So, the easy accessibility of financial funds especially by big enterprises and 
business groups (chaebols in South Korea) supported by policy influences led invest in risk 
sectors because of externalization of risk cost. Additionally, some of them were more 
interested in the real property sector (building); tradable sectors were less interesting and lost 
competitiveness. Because one indicator to measure how increase the indebtedness risky as a 
part of moral hazard is the ratio of Short-Term Debt to Foreign Exchange Reserves, the last 
years before starting the financial crisis it had increased quickly, especially in South Korea  
and Thailand. At the same time these economies presented the highest Current Account 
Deficit and both resulted being the worst damaged. 
                                                          
7
 Korea and Thailand have both changed governments since the onset of the crisis, a new President was elected 
in Philippines, and the current Indonesia President was weakening health. Radelt and Sachs (1998). “The Onset 
of the Asian Financial Crisis”.  
8
 Ibid.  
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On the other hand, International Monetary Fund (IMF) was not alerted about 
possibilities of financial crisis in this Asian region up to October 1997; on contrary the IMF 
had predicted high economic growth rates for Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan), which in turn led international investors even been more interested in the 
region. It is also fair to point out that in this region, different other financial crisis, the 
Sovereign Debt remained at prudent level, as well as had been existed strictly discipline in 
Fiscal Accounts without Deficits (Radelt and Sachs, 1998); therefore, it was a little difficult 
for specialist predicted this Financial Crisis. Later the IMF recommended these countries 
improving banking regulation/supervision, increasing the interest rate and cut the public 
spending, which contributed to the economic contraction/recession in Asian countries. 
Another example of inappropriate financial regulation and poor supervision occurred 
under the adoption of liberalization policies was Mexico (1994-95), because of unrestrained 
financial and commercial liberalization policies adopted since the decade of 1980s. This 
produced a huge capital inflows, but without suitable regulation and supervision by the 
government. This was especially after the incorporation of Mexico to the General Agreement 
of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1986 (Licona, 2011). This allowed some private institutions 
to fall in Moral Hazard behavior with high indebtedness and riskiness, the monetary reserve 
requirements of the banks were eliminated, there were no capitalization rules based on market 
risk costs, lead increasing the default portfolio, the expansion of Central Bank credit in 1994 
as a last resort lender and forming price-asset bubbles. “The unseemly attraction of foreign 
resources, the liquidation of large amounts of government debt, and moral hazard nurtured an 
increasing in the private aggregate demand that contributed to the rapidly rising Current 
Account Deficit” (Gil, 1997)9. 
Different factors contributed to increase the amount of credits such as the reduction in 
the Public Debt, the phenomenal international availability of securitized debt, poor borrower 
screening and credit-volume excesses; moreover, moral hazard was increased by the 
unlimited backing of bank liabilities (Gil, 1997). Indeed, all these factors contributed directly 
the externalization of risk costs for financial investors. There were over expectations of 
investors in Mexican economy, just it signed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with United 
                                                          
 
9
 The Origin´s of Mexico 1994 Financial Crisis. The Cato Journal. 
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States of America and Canada (NAFTA), its accession to the Organization Countries for 
Economic Development (OCDE), as well as the good performance of Latin America 
economies in the first lustrum of 1990s. Finally, other political event that detrimentally 
triggered the financial crisis in Mexico was the assassination of a presidential candidate in 
March, 1994
10
. 
In this way, the Deficit in the Balance of Trade rose near 6 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product, about 81 percent was explained by the rising in private investment, which 
was basically directed into unprofitable ventures, contributing to the unsustainability of the 
Current-Account Deficit. But this fact was a result of the hard Foreign Exchange Rate policy 
too (Licona, 2011) developed under the President Salinas (1988-1994). For instance, some of 
those undertakings were highly leveraged tollroads, unrecoverable home mortgages, or credit 
unions that invested with low or negative returns financed through the development banks. 
Some of the credit went to finance nonexistent enterprises or the hugely levered acquisition of 
bank shares, or went to non-collateralized loans
11
. 
One decade before, in the 1980s, different countries around the world, included Latin 
American (Peru, Chile and Bolivia) were suffered the impact of the Crisis Debt; however, the 
Chilean experience is more relevant to help us explaining one other financial crises where, 
among other factors, the absence of appropriate supervision on the financial sector by the 
government, increasing of the international liabilities of the private sector as well as the 
wrong allocation of the financial funds in the private sector, led into financial crisis. 
Furthermore, an audit report published by the World Bank´s Operations Evaluation 
Department on Chile structural adjustment loans highlighted that the lack of prudential 
supervision of financial institutions in increasing the economy´s vulnerability to such an 
extent to collapse (World Bank, 1999a, p.2)
12
. There were other factors such as overvaluation 
of the Real Exchange Rate under Chilean fixed regimen, booming in the real state sector, high 
Current Account Deficit of Balance of Payments, which were triggered by external shocks, 
                                                          
10
 Luis Donaldo Colosio of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was killed in March 23, few days 
before Presidential election; later was elected Mr. Ernesto Zedillo, in August 21th., 1994. 
11
 http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj17n3-14.html  
12
 Therefore, we can see how the financial crisis was caused by lack of supervision, but not by the adaptation of 
Washington Consensus recommendations. 
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like the increasing of the international interest rate caused by the monetary policy contraction 
in the USA and decreasing on the Terms of Trade for Latin American.  
In the first half of 1980 years, Chile suffered a financial crisis and collapsed its financial 
sector, Chilean Private Pension Fund (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, AFPs) had to 
be bailed out by government with public budget (Central Bank), as well as some broken 
private banks, through their nationalization. After that, both financial rescuing operations for 
long years have been part of the Chilean Fiscal Deficit that received the elegant name of 
socialization of the Debt, its cost was more than 2 percent of the GDP, US$ 4 billons (Larrain 
and Vergara, 2000)
13
. It is also fair to point out that according to its powerful, presence and 
participation in the political decisions in that period, the military sector still keeping in the 
Public Pension Fund with the aim to prevent them far from some future financial crises. This 
is only one other part of the Moral Hazard problem because of the fact that some sectors near 
governmental decisions are taking advantage respect to others. 
Table N
o
 2.1: Causes or Factors that Triggered Financial Crisis (1980-2000s) 
Factors: 
Argentina 
2001 
Brazil 
1999 
Russia 
1998 
East 
Asia 
1997 
Mexico 
1994 
Chile 
1982 
U.S.A 
2007 
Euro 
Zone 
Fixed Exchange Rate 
Regimen 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -.- Yes 
Over valuation of 
Exchange Rate 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -.- Yes 
High Public Debt and 
Fiscal Deficit 
Yes Yes Yes Not Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Current Account Deficit 
and External Sector 
Problems 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Private Sector Over 
Indebted 
Not Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Boom in the real state 
sector 
Not Not Not Yes Not Yes Yes Yes 
Contagion Effects Not Yes Yes Not Not Not Not Yes 
Scarce Accountability and 
Institutional Regulation 
Failure: Moral Hazard 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
High expectations on 
economic successful 
Not Yes Not Yes Yes Not Not Not 
Global Currency (US$ or 
Euro) 
Not Not Not Not Not Not Yes Yes 
    Source: Different international studies about financial crises. 
                                                          
13
 Larraín, Felipe. y Vergara, Rodrigo. “La Transformación Económica de Chile”, Centro de Estudios Públicos 
(CEP). Chile, 2000. 
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In short, all the factors that were forming part of the Moral hazard behavior based on 
empirical observation because of the externalization of risk cost for commercial financial 
institutions like banks under political –explicit or implicit- support defined in the introduction 
were presented not only in the previous financial crisis, but also in the current Sovereign Debt 
Crisis in periphery Euro-zone countries, as we can see in the Table N
o
 2.1. Furthermore, “in 
many ways the financial crisis has confirmed the impression of the minimal relevance of the 
current multilateral legal framework regulating trade in services for the prevention and 
management of financial crisis”14. The table No 2.1 summarized the factors that contributed 
triggering the different episodes of financial crises around the world. 
 
III.- ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION THEORY AND APPLIED MORAL HAZARD 
DEFINITION  
It is not wonder that Moral Hazard is one of the results of the Asymmetric Information 
problem that is presented normally in all market interactions, markets with one side or the 
other imperfectly informed are markets with imperfect information. Imperfectly informed 
markets with one side better informed than the other are markets with asymmetric information 
(Varian, 2000); therefore, the neoclassical paradigm of perfect competition markets does not 
exist in fact due to this problem, and others. In this way, there are prominent economist 
scholars that have been even laureate with the Nobel Prize in Economics according to their 
seminal academic research in this area. For instance, George Akerlof
15
, Michael Spence
16
 and 
Joe Stiglitz
17
 whose original research have originated the Theory of Information in the 
modern Microeconomics courses.  
According with different economic research this Theory of Asymmetric Information has 
been applied by economic practitioners like financing and banking, insurance services, 
businesses, labor markets; however, not enough times in order to assess the origins of 
                                                          
14
 Delimatsis, Panagiotis (2009). “Financial Services Trade After Crisis”. 
15
 Akerlof, George (1970). The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.  
16
 Spence, Michael (1973). Job Market Signaling and Book Market Signaling.  
17
 Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976). 
- 12 - 
 
Financial Crises around the world: to study the Asymmetric information between commercial 
financial institutions (banks) and the financial regulator (government), which originated the 
classic problem of Agent - Principal.  
In the first case, we have George Akerlof who analyses a special market of goods 
(second hand autos) where sellers have better information about the quality of the products 
that they are offering regarding the buyers, so this market needs to be regulated in order to 
separate markets between (i) appropriate second hand autos and (ii) wrong second hand autos 
(so-called lemons). Otherwise, if the market is not regulated and the buyers cannot observe 
the quality of the product, unscrupulous and irresponsible sellers can offer and sell wrong 
second hand autos (lemons) as the high quality ones. “It should also be perceived that in these 
markets social and private returns differ, and in some cases government observations make 
increase the social welfare of all parties; or private institutions may arise to take advantage of 
the potential increases in welfare which can accrue to all parties”18.  
Another prominent academic researcher in this theoretic economy related area is 
Michael Spence who was focused on the labor market saying that according to asymmetric 
information, high productive workers may get education exactly as a signal just of their high 
productivity; therefore, he has developed the “signaling theory” that differs in the treating 
from moral hazard approaches. Moreover, we have Joe Stiglitz (and Rothschild) researches 
about adverse selection as a result from asymmetric information problem too. These authors 
considered that the insurance businesses where companies do not have information ex ante 
about the risk of their potential clients, while clients know well about themselves and their 
own effort to avoid accidents.  
In this way, under asymmetric information these authors consider two kinds of 
equilibriums: pooling and separating. In the first, all individuals buy the same amount of 
insurance, in the other clients purchase different contracts. One of the important theoretic 
conclusions from this academic working paper is that asymmetric information markets need to 
be regulated, especially the financial market. Consequently, Stiglitz has developed economic 
theories about hypothesis of efficiency on financial markets (with Grossman, 1980) and credit 
markets (with Weiss, 1981). 
                                                          
18
 Akerlof, George (1970). The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.  
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As occurred in some economic scopes of analysis there are different forms of 
understand the significance of the Moral Hazard, as well as based on the externalization of 
risk costs which is assumed detrimentally by innocent bystanders (Mack, 2011)
19
. So, this 
topic has not been considered only as an important development for the modern 
Microeconomic Theory, but also it has been applying in Financial Theory, Macroeconomics 
Theory and International Economics research areas, under the same meaning of the reaction 
behavior of economic agents because of existing of special incentives to becoming 
neglectfulness and increase the risk of a loss (Varian, 2000). For instance, following Akerlof 
and Romer (1994), as well as Radelt and Sachs (1998), they understand that the moral hazard 
related financial crises arises because of the fact that the banks are able to borrowing funds on 
the basis or implicit and explicit public guarantees of bank liabilities (externalization of risk 
cots). For the both last mentioned authors coincidentally, “if banks are undercapitalized or 
under-regulated, they may use these funds in overly risky or even criminal ventures”.  
Furthermore, Akerlof and Romer argued that the “economic of looting,” in which banks 
use their state backing to purloin deposit, is more common than is generally perceived and 
played a large role in the United States of America savings and loan crisis. Krugman (1998) 
argued that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is a reflection of excessive gambling and indeed 
stealing by banks that gained access to domestic and foreign deposits by virtue of state 
guarantees on these deposits
20
. So in this thesis, another theoretic support will be economic 
theoretic models about financial crisis. For instance, according to Basu model (2009) of the 
financial crisis (2007-09), who builds a rational expectation microeconomic model about why 
the local crisis escalated into a general freeze in credit flows. The author includes a risk of 
default, there is the probability p that the entire loan will repaid and the probability 1-p that 
the loan will not be repaid; where p (0<p<1) depends on different factors, such as banking 
regulation and supervision (by the government). Consequently, with appropriate banking 
regulation and supervision it is hopefully that the p increasing.   
Another important related theoretic model was developed by Diamond and Dybving 
(1983), which provides a mathematical statement to explain how a commercial financial 
institution with long maturity assets (such as businesses, investors and mortgages loans 
                                                          
19
 Hillman (1992) pointed out that limited liabilities, similar to externalize risk cost, is very inefficient. 
20
 Radelt and Sachs (1998). The Onset of the Asian Financial Crisis. (Cited in) 
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offered) and short-maturity liabilities (such as public deposits which can be withdrawn at any 
time) may be highly unstable for financial system. Indeed, it can help us understand bank runs 
and consequently the financial crisis in a country. Furthermore, according to Roubini it is also 
fair to point out that “no attempt at understanding the financial crisis of 2008-09 can be made 
without also considering the intellectual canvas against which it proceeded, one that long 
championed the innate virtues of markets efficiency, financial innovation and financial market 
opening, literally as ends in themselves”.21 In this way, he predicted in advance the U.S.A. 
mortgage crisis based on past financial crisis experiences. 
Following to Bengt Holmstrom (1979) we can represent an asymmetric information 
model in formal terms (mathematically), in which one unrealistic feature is the assumption 
that the agent or commercial financial institution (bank) chooses their actions (and efforts) a, 
having the same information as the principal or regulator (Government Agency), which 
means that before anything about the state of the nature () is revealed; of course commonly 
this will not be the case. In the situation that the principal o regulator (Government Agency) 
observes only the outcome x, s(x) denote the share of x that goes to the agent and r(x) = x – 
s(x) denotes the share of the outcome that goes to the principal (financial regulator). It is 
assumed that both parties agree on the probability distribution of  and that the agent chooses 
a before  is known, where a represents a productive input called the effort. In this case 
(constrained) Pareto optimal
22
 sharing rules s(x) are generated by the follow mathematical 
program (i), in which G(x) is the principal o regulator´s utility function, defined under 
outcome (x) alone, which represents the interests of a part of the society, and H(x,a) is the 
agent or (private) financial institution´s utility function (part of the society), defined also over 
outcome (x) and efforts (a).            
 
                       𝑀𝑎𝑥: 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒: 𝑊{𝐺(𝑟(𝑥)), 𝐻(𝑠(𝑥))}…………….…………. (i) 
                                                  𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸{𝐺(𝑥 − 𝑠(𝑥))} ..…………..…………………..(ii) 
                                        𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸{𝐻(𝑠(𝑥), 𝑎)} ≥ 𝐻…………………...………..(iii) 
𝑎 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸{𝐻(𝑠(𝑥), 𝑎´)} 
                                                          
21
 Delimatsis, Panagiotis (2009). Financial Services Trade after Crisis (cited in). An additional review of 
Roubini´s point of view has been commented by Stephen Mihn in her “The New York Times” column: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/magazine/17pessimist-t.html?pagewanted=all  
22
 “Pareto optimal” is referred that situation in which is not possible that somebody (or one of the parties) 
improves its welfare condition without impoverish the other (part).   
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In this way, we can establish a social welfare function W based on the utility of 
regulator (the government) and the utility of the commercial financial institution (bank), but 
after reordering the functions we can obtain the same results by maximizing in practical terms 
the expected welfare function of the Regulator (ii), in accordance with the regulator utility 
function based on observed results (x) discounted the utility of financial institutions. There is 
a negative relationship between the regulator´s utility and the outcome or results taken by the 
commercial financial institutions (trade off); however, both conform at the same time the 
social welfare (W). The constraint (iii) guarantees that the agent or commercial financial 
institution (bank) gets a minimum expected utility H attained via the financial market or 
negotiation process. The argmax denotes the set of arguments that maximize the objective 
functions that follows, at the same time this constrain reflects the restriction that the principal 
can observe x but not a. If he also could observe a, a forcing contract to internalize cost risk 
could be used easily to guarantee that the commercial financial institution (the agent) selects a 
proper action or effort even when s(x) is chosen to solve the first to restrictions ignoring the 
third.   
After the sharing rule is fixed, the commercial financial institution will often learn 
something new about the difficult of its tasks or the environment in which it is to be 
performed. Let z be the signal about  which the agent or commercial financial institution 
observes prior to choosing a, so that this choice becomes a function a(z), as before we 
suppress  and write f(x,y,z,a) for the joint density function, where y is some additional 
information observed by both parties. The best sharing rules s(x,y) can be determined to solve 
the program:    
                                      𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∫ 𝐺(𝑥 − 𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦))𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦|𝑧, 𝑎(𝑧))𝑝(𝑧)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑧………………… (v) 
 Where G(w) is the principal´s utility function defined over wealth (w= x - s) alone, 
subject to: 
              ∫ 𝑈(𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦))𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦|𝑧, 𝑎(𝑧))𝑝(𝑧)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑧 − ∫ 𝑉(𝑎(𝑧))𝑝(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 ≥ 𝐻,̅̅̅………….…. (vi) 
                      𝑎(𝑧) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∫ 𝑈(𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦))𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦|𝑧, 𝑎´)𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦 − 𝑉(𝑎´), ∀𝑧.…………..(vii) 
Here f(x,y/z,a) is the conditional density function of x and y, given z and the action a, 
and p(z) is the marginal density of z. Letting u(z)p(z) be the multiplier function for the second 
equation and  the multiplier for the first restriction, point-wise gives the characterization:  
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𝐺´(𝑥−𝑠(𝑥,𝑦))
𝑈´(𝑠(𝑥,𝑦))
=  +
∫ µ(𝑧).𝑓𝑎(𝑥,𝑦|𝑧,𝑎(𝑧))𝑝(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∫ 𝑓(𝑥,𝑦|𝑧,𝑎(𝑧))𝑝(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
……………..…. (viii) 
The second term on the right hand side of this equation (viii) indicates a deviation from 
a first best solution; consequently, under asymmetric information the society does not reach 
Pareto optimum, being necessary to establish a deductible in order to internalize the risk cost 
of the commercial financial institutions. 
In the context of the Principal – Agent relationship, the Agent (commercial financial 
institution or bank) provides a productive input called the effort (a) in order to not over taking 
risk positions, that cannot be observed by the Principal (the government Financial Regulatory 
Agency) directly; of course, the results relate to a very specific kind of imperfect of the 
agent´s actions. Therefore, the Principal (Regulatory Agency) does not know to what extent a 
social contract has been satisfied by the Agency (banks), because of the Asymmetric 
Information problem. Therefore, financial institutions (the Agent in the model) use their 
authority only for their own benefit (sometimes selfishness) rather than take into in 
consideration the Financial Regulatory Agency (Principal), which represents the interests of 
the society, their financial creditors and public depositors; indeed, there is a clear 
disagreement between both kinds of institutions. Of course, this causes the modification of the 
probability distribution function of the outcome x, which can be identified mathematically in 
terms of continuous time by the area under the first integral wealth function of the program 
(equation v). 
However, following Jehle and Reny (2000) we can establish a model in which we can 
assess how commercial Financial Institutions (Agents) can be less concerned in accordance 
with the financial support of The Principal (Government) that led them to externalize risk 
costs; unfortunately, the Principal or Regulatory Institution cannot observe the actions or 
efforts (a) that Private Financial Institutions are doing in order to manage public funds (from 
depositors) appropriate. In this way, the Principal must structure their policies so that the 
policies themselves induce the Agents to take an appropriate level of care by internalizing risk 
costs. When a Principal has a stake in the action taken by an Agent, but the Agent´s action 
cannot be observed by the Principal, the situation is said to involve moral hazard. The 
Principal-Agent problem is for the Principal to design an incentive scheme so that the Agent 
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(Commercial Financial Institution) takes an appropriate action
23
. So, to simplify we can 
establish a model in which exists the Regulatory Agency and only one commercial Financial 
Institution, this last can incur in losses resulting in a varying amount of loss L, ranging from 1 
through L monetary units; depending on the severity of the risky financial operation. It is 
possible that the loss has been avoided wholly (L = 0). Under the assumptions: 
 (i) The probability of incurring in a risk operation resulting in losses of l € {0, 1,…L} is 
given by the p(a) > 0, where a is the action or amount of effort exerted toward safe financial 
operations by the Agent; of course the probability (p) is affected by the such efforts. For each 
fixed effort a, we have that: 
∑ 𝜋𝑙(𝑎) = 1
𝑙
 
(ii) There are only two possible effort levels for the Financial Institutions or Agent, a = 
0 denote low effort and a = 1 denote high effort. 
(iii) Higher effort by the financial institution to reduce risky financial operations result 
in lower likelihood that they will have serious financial losses L, avoiding costly financial 
crisis in the society. 
 So, the best policy for the government financial regulator will differ as well as 
depending on whether it wishes to induce the commercial financial institutions or banks to 
choose high or low effort to avoid taking risky and awkward financial operations by 
internalizing the risk cost. Unfortunately, under asymmetric information situation that use to 
be in the financial markets, there is an additional restriction regarding the symmetric 
information situation; consequently, we have Paretto-inefficient outcomes because of the fact 
that there is a high cost for the regulator (government) when it intends to induce high effort (a 
= 1) of commercial financial institutions (banks) to avoid turmoil. 
 
IV.- CAUSES OF PERIPHERY EURO-ZONE CRISIS: STATISTIC ASSESSMENT  
Indeed the Moral Hazard behavior of some economic agents and politicians have been 
presented in all Financial Crisis previously (ex-ante) triggered them; not only in the United 
                                                          
23
 Jehle, Geoffrey and Reny, Philip (2,000). Advanced Microeconomic Theory. The Addison-Wesley. 
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States of American mortgages or real state crises, but also in the developing and/or emerging 
economies. For instance, some authors have been considered among other factors how the 
domestic economic agents (included governments) were irresponsible over spending and 
making risky investment beyond their means under the externalization of risk cost. 
Consequently, one of the compelling results was over indebtedness with foreign creditors 
under free interest rate, especially in the Short Terms. Sometimes private sector was 
guaranteed implicitly by the governments to bolster the development or bailout (rescue) of 
some special sectors or group of enterprises, especially from financial sector
24
. However, the 
difficulties of the Euro Monetary Union introduction had been existed before its introduction 
(ex-ante). 
 
4.1.- EMU origins and Moral Hazard 
It said that had not been existed previously a serious economic assessments (ex-ante) 
about the consequences and sustainability of EMU, it is believed that the motivations had 
been more politic related ones rather than economy oriented; for  intance, their promoters did 
not take care about the different economy characteristics inside these varied countries. 
Furthermore, the introduction of the Euro currency resulted in a loosing of Nominal Exchange 
Rate Anchor and monetary political tools of each individual Central Bank for adjusting 
against specific external or domestic shocks, which was assigned to the regional European 
Central Bank. In this way, nowadays the interest rate has the aim to maintain the average 
stability of the Euro-zone, rather than respond to the conditions of an individual or specific 
member country (Glick, 2012)
25
, in order to reach a particular socioeconomic aim.  
Furthermore, the political leaders have been postponed the introduction of the Fiscal 
Union, not only with the aim to not loss sovereign, but also in order to not loss presence in the 
World Economy. Different Budgets require different financing in a region where some 
members have very low tax revenues; consequently, they had been financing their spending 
                                                          
24
 This fact was registered for example under industrialization policies to bolstering the development of special 
productive sectors such as microchips, carmakers, heavy chemical industry in South Korea (1997) under the 
government-led-economy oriented development model. In other cases to finance public and private adventure 
risky entrepreneurial operations as in the case of the Industrial Substitution Import models in Latin America 
(1970 and 1980 years). 
25
 It is also fair to point out that according to “Theory of Optimal Currency Area” a common currency is more 
appropriate for countries with: (i) similar shocks and business cycles, (ii) high trade integration, (iii) internal 
labor flexibility, and (iv) fiscal policy flexibility (Mundell, 1961). 
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with borrowing from commercial banks by issuing sophisticated financial instruments. It is 
said that recently by middle of 2012, they are talking in order to adopt the Fiscal Union. 
Likewise, another factor that had been taken for granted before the introduction of 
EMU has been the commercial openness intensity, which is different in each country. One 
country with different characteristics should issue its own currency (Mudell, 1961), keeping 
Flexible Exchange Rate regarding other currencies; this is contrary what happened in the 
Euro-zone
26
. Therefore, in the context of the current EMU, countries by themselves cannot 
retain the ability to restore or gain national competitiveness by devaluing or depreciating their 
own national currencies, simply and solely because they do not exist. Meade (1957) argued 
that the conditions for a common currency did not exist in Western Europe because of the 
lack of labor mobility; consequently, a system of Flexible Exchange Rates would be more 
effective in promoting Balance of Payment equilibrium and internal stability
27
. 
Under different labor market structures with different real unit labor costs, rigidity 
labor regulations and different intensity grades of labor mobility in each Euro country, it 
could be possible that they have problems in the salary and prices flexibility as well as in the 
economy adjustments, caused losing of competitiveness and serious unemployment problems. 
“Real unit labor costs related to major trading partners (a rough measure of national 
competitiveness) are moving against some of the poorer Southern countries of the Euro zone, 
Italy in particular; almost similar with United Kingdom”28. For instance, Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Italy were showing the highest increase of the Labor Unit Cost, while in Germany 
this indicator was reducing.  
 
4.2.- Moral Hazard Index 
In spite of the fact that most scholars have not been considering moral hazard 
behavior as one of the main or central factors of the financial crises (third generation models) 
presented especially before triggering them. However, recently some authors have shyly 
recognized this problem as one of the main causes of this current European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis. For instance, they said that some people have believed that the current crisis was 
                                                          
26
 Mundell, Robert (1961). “A Theory of Optimum Currency Area”. 
27
 Mundell, Robert (1961). “A Theory of Optimum Currency Area” (cited in).  
28
 Jones, Erick (2009). “The Euro and the Financial Crisis”. 
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fundamentally caused by profligate and irresponsible behavior by governments, politicians 
and individuals in the Euro Zone periphery countries. “Let's call this the local cause point of 
view: Government Deficits and Debts in the periphery were so large that once the Great 
Recession of 2008-09 hit, investors lost confidence in the ability of those countries to remain 
solvent. So they tried to dump the bonds from those countries, triggering the crisis”29.   
In this way, one of the first index that this document consider to assessing the 
possibility of financial crisis is the ratio Short Term External Debt (International claims - up 
to and including one year)
30
 between the Foreign Exchange Reserve
31
 in absolute terms, 
which provides us with information about the profligacy indebtedness of one country without 
appropriate guarantee in Foreign Exchange Reserve. It is also fair to point out that this 
indicator was used before to assessing Asian Financial crisis in an Early Warning Model by 
Zhuang and Dowling (2002). On contrary, sound Foreign Exchange Reserve management is 
important because of they can increase a country´s or region´s overall resilience to shocks, 
improve the ability to respond effectively to financial crisis and reduce financial and 
reputational costs
32
.   
This situation has been associated just with the Euro currency adoption which 
produced an interest rates falling only in the early 2000s, a momentarily surge in confidence 
as institutions and a false sensation of risk reduction. It was believed that the incomes of the 
periphery Euro-zone member countries were expected to converge to those of Europe´s 
northern core economies, exacerbated the expectation of economic improvement and future 
wealth-fare in PIIGS countries, spending beyond their own means. At the same time the 
monetary policy became more expansionary, causing reduction of the interest rate, increasing 
the domestic demand, bidding up the price of no tradable goods to tradable as the real state 
sector, attracting more investment in the no tradable sector with less productivity, and 
increasing the rates of wages relative to productivity loosing competitiveness. “The single 
                                                          
29
 (Note: by the "EZ periphery" I mean Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and maybe Spain. Italy has not really been 
accused of such behavior, to my knowledge, and it seems generally accepted that it is much more the victim of 
contagion rather than the cause of the crisis.) 
   http://streetlightblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/what-really-caused-eurozone-crisis-part.html  
30
 According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), statistics. 
31
 Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by 
the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. The gold component of 
these reserves is valued at year-end (December 31) London prices. World Bank. 
32
 International Monetary Fund (2000). Guideline for Foreign Exchange Reserve Management. 
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monetary policy of the Euro-zone was too loose for the countries which enjoyed the 
temporary biggest boom and accentuated their inflation and competitiveness losses; 
consequently, paradoxically PIIGS countries have become increasingly uncompetitive since 
adopting the Euro” (Dadush, 2010).  
In the Graph N
o
 4.1, the moral hazard index shows that the surge of the over 
indebtedness has been produced after the introduction of the Euro and accentuated around 
2003. Initially, paradoxically, these countries showed a transitory improvement. Furthermore, 
some governments were hiding information about the real situation. So, according to this 
graph Greece and Spain have been ones of the most profligate countries, of course they have 
not been provided a level of confidence to markets that their countries can meet their external 
financial obligations on time. At the same time just in these two countries the average annual 
growth rate of credit to private sector between 2000 and 2011 years have been presented the 
highest rate increasing, with more than 13 and 12 percent respectively (De Haan, 2012). 
However, if we include the index of Germany (core North Euro), we notice that this country 
has been keeping a more stabilizing index in the 2000s. 
Graph N
o
 4.1.- Short Term External Debt / Foreign Exchange Reserve  
(Absolute annual rates) 
 
 
               Source: Bank for International Settlements and World Bank 
   
 
The financial situation of Ireland is even more compelling according to this indicator, 
this ratio reached 500 times, see Graph N
o
 4.2. Therefore, it shows that there has not been 
interest by Irish authorities in maintaining its foreign currency liquidity to absorb external 
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shocks, dealt with stoppages of external inflows, suddenly outflows of capitals or when the 
access to external borrowings will be scary, to cope effectively with possible financial crisis. 
One of the main causes in the current Ireland´s financial situation is because the government 
has maintained implicitly guarantees for the six domestic main banks. For instance, issued 
special bonds by September 2008 and September 2009 to support these banks by removing 
their risk loans, especially from homeowners and property builders, who were over 
indebtedness under the boom of the real state sector and the access to low cost credits provide 
by the EMU; in the context that the house prices in Ireland quadrupled between 1996 and 
2007 (Whelan, 2011).  
After collapsing of the real state sector and becoming the banking crisis, the 
government decided to nationalize some of the banks and recapitalized others; the average 
annual growth rate of credit to private sector between 2000 and 2011 has been more than 11 
percent (De Haan, 2012). It is also fair to point out that the increasing of the Irish public 
spending was more than other Euro-zone countries and presented with a structural deficit; 
consequently, the annual growth of government expenditure in Ireland has been higher than 
Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, led to be unsustainable the government debt
33
. 
The rescue of the Ireland hugely expanded financial sector cost around 13.9 percent of 
GDP
34
, the Irish banks lost more than € 100 billion because of defaulted loans to property 
developers and homeowners made real state or property bubble burst, along with 
unemployment increased and loosing of competitiveness in the private sector, austerity and 
deficit in the public sector accounts. So, Irish banks lent money building owners, which in 
turn generated a real state bubble, loss of competitiveness and also a detriment in the trading 
sectors. The average annual growth rate of credit to private sector has been more than 11 
percent between 2000 and 2011 (De Haan, 2012). Later, some executives of the principal 
Irish banks were obligated to resign, contributing to financial panic of creditors and increasing 
the long-term government bond yield spreads regarding core countries.  
Graph N
o
 4.2.- Irish Short Term External Debt / Foreign Exchange Reserve  
(Absolute annual rates) 
                                                          
33
 Some authors said that in the case of Debt with the rest of the world, the most dramatic case was Ireland which 
moved from a net creditor position of 52 percent of the GDP in 1999 to a net debtor position of 71 per cent of 
the GDP in 2008 (De Haan, 2012). 
34
 Dadush, Uri and Stancil, Bennett (2010). Europe´s Debt Crisis: More than a Fiscal Problem. 
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Source: Bank for International Settlements and World Bank 
 
4.3.- Foreign Exchange Reserve disappeared  
Another related variable that can be used to show the moral hazard behavior of these 
countries is the profligacy in maintaining considerable Foreign Exchange Reserves to deal 
with financial disequilibrium, which have been decreased in all these Western countries in the 
last decade after the introduction of the Euro currency. Undoubtedly, this behavior can be 
understand as the disinterest of the governments to complying with their creditors, repaying 
their External Debts, dealing with external liabilities and international adverse shocks, and 
manipulates their domestic currency (the Euro) in order to protect their international 
commercial and financial operations. Additionally, let us not forget that high Foreign 
Exchange Reserve allows countries getting better credit ratings by international grading 
agencies and less cost in their international finance operations and access to financing.  
Table N
o
 4.1: Simple Annual Average of Foreign Exchange Reserves in Months of 
Import of good and services (1990-2009)  
 
 
            Source: World Bank 
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In the Table N
o
 4.1, that shows us the average Foreign Exchange Reserves (FER) in 
months of imports for different periods (lustrums), we can see clearly how Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain have been profligates with this economic stock variable (FER); in 
months of imports they dramatically decreased. For instance, in the case of Greece, since 5.44 
months of imports in the 1990s, felt toward less than one month in the 2005-09s, in average. 
In the case of Portugal, since 6.88 months of goods and services imports in the 1990s, felt 
towards 1.32 months in the last 2000s. Similarly, in the case of Spain, since 4.62 months of 
imports in the 1990s, felt toward 0.49 month in the last 2000s
35
. Indeed, the most dramatic 
situation is the case of Ireland, since 1.82 months in the first 1990s, felt toward less than 5 
percent of only one (1) month of imports in the last 2000s. This last result actually coincided 
with the previous assessment.  
There is no doubt that this international financial situation could be seen again as a 
result of the moral hazard problem in periphery countries, because of the fact that by issuing 
Euros as international reserve and transactional currency they could have been helped to 
finance their own imports of goods and services from third countries, especially from 
developing countries which their domestic currencies are not considered international reserve. 
Moreover, because of the accumulation of high Foreign Exchange Reserve allows countries 
the possibility to repaid their External Debts and liabilities, we can understand that they have 
been not willing to fulfill external creditors on time; furthermore, dealing with the sudden 
stoppages of capital inflows or outflows. In absolute terms (Graph N
o
 4.4) we can see how the 
Foreign Exchange Reserves have been quickly reduced in these periphery countries, while in 
Germany has been increasing, after the introduction of Euro.  
Graph N
o
 4.3: Total Foreign Exchange Reserves in Months of Imports (1990-2009) 
 
                                                          
35
 This compelling situation has originated that by the end of April 2012, Standard and Poor´s Rating 
Agency downgraded Spain in two levels, reaching the category of BBB
+
, in negative perspective; 
because of there existed the risk that the government support banks and increase its Public Debt. 
- 25 - 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
On the other hand, nowadays developing countries as East Asian and Latin American 
economies, after suffering compelling financial crisis have been disciplinary maintained high 
Foreign Exchange Reserves in the last years. For example, in the case of Chile, Peru, China 
and Korea, among others, their current stock of Foreign Exchange Reserves can finance more 
than ten (10) months of their imports. Let us not forget that monetary authorities keep up with 
Foreign Exchange Reserves with the aim to finance external imbalances, avoiding adjust 
dramatically their economy activity. Of course, in the Fixed Exchange Rate regimen Central 
Banks maintain Foreign Reserves even if not to neutralize the operations of automatic 
mechanism (Ossa, 1997). The optimum average amount of FERs is determined by the need to 
reach an optimal combination between the external adjustment and financing in these 
countries; and the benefits are given by the avoided economic adjustment cost.    
Graph N
o
 4.4: Total Foreign Exchange Reserves in US$ million (1991-2010) 
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Source: World Bank 
 
4.4.- Huge Fiscal Imbalances 
This subsection assesses other main indicators that show us how periphery European 
countries (PIIGS) have been mismanaging their own Public Budgets in the 2000s with the aim 
to avoid possible Financial Crisis, becoming later the Sovereign Debt Crisis. So, I can start 
with the result of the Public Finance, Table N
o
 4.2, in which clearly we can realize that those 
countries unfortunately have not been disciplinary managed their fiscal operations, living 
these governments inconsistently beyond their own means and tax revenues. Additionally, 
after introducing Euro and the reduction of the interest rate and the possibility to access cheap 
credit, “the per capita employee compensation (average wage) rose by an annual average of 
5.9 percent (included private and public sectors) in these PIIGS countries, faster than North 
countries with only 3.2 percent. Furthermore, the increase in the periphery was not matched 
by improvements in labor productivity” (Dadush and Stancil, 2010); which in turn led 
periphery lost international competitiveness.  
Table N
o
 4.2: Annual Average of General Government Deficit/Surplus (% GDP) 
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                            Source: European Commission-Eurostat 
 
Periphery countries have been maintained high Fiscal Deficits in the second lustrum of 
2000s, in spite of the fact that they had been getting a sporadic and short reduction only in the 
first 2000 years, just after introducing the Euro, and also as a result of one of the restrictions 
introduced European Monetary Union states in the “Maastricht Treaty” (1992) and then in the 
“Stability and Growth Pact” (1997). This policy was adopted in order to reduce their Fiscal 
Budget Deficits ceiling of less than 3 percent of GDP and their External Debt ceiling of less 
than 60 percent of GDP; as well as acknowledging the inherent risk of crisis due to the fact 
that the introduction of the new common currency in this very heterogeneous economically 
speaking European commercial block (Sandoval, Bertrand, and others, 2011)
36
.  
However, it seems that these restrictions were taken into consideration by 
policymakers only in this small period because later, in the 2006-10 years the Fiscal Deficits 
were dramatically increased; especially, in the cases of Ireland (reached 32 percent of the 
GDP in 2010), Greece, Portugal and Spain, which in turn meant that these countries had been 
accumulating a high stock of Public Debts. On the other hand, in average Italy was 
maintained its Public Deficit at the same level and the core Euro-zone countries were reduced 
its Deficit showing less levels than the periphery, for instance Germany reached only 1 
percent of GDP in 2011
37
. 
                                                          
36
 Furthermore, they agreed greater coordination in monetary and economic policies from members of 
the Monetary Union, lowering the degree of national sovereignty and clout for certain member 
states. The Europe Sovereign Crisis (Sandoval, Bertrand, and other, 2011: 3). 
37
 It is also fair to point out that in the last months these countries have made efforts in order to restore 
confidence, especially in the Fiscal scope strengthening the rules governing the budgetary discipline. 
This is why central bankers call upon the European governments to increase the emergency facility 
as soon as possible (De Haan, 2012).  
1995-99 2000-05 2006-10
Belgium -2.44 -0.47 -2.28
France -3.44 -2.78 -4.58
Greece -5.22 -9.68
Ireland 0.82 1.45 -9.96
Italy -4.34 -3.08 -3.54
Portugal -3.82 -3.73 -6.14
Spain -4.18 -0.12 -4.14
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As we can see in the Graph N
o
 4.5, in the 2006-10 years the annual average Central 
Government Deficits increased in Ireland, Greece and Portugal regarding the five previous 
years. In the case of Portugal the highest public spends, among other causes, have been 
associated with the political situation as the large costly Carnation Revolution (1974-2010). 
Therefore, the government was hazardously bolstered public-private partnerships, risky 
credits, external consultancy and private advisory for more than three decades. At the same 
time, they were attempting to control the military insurgences in the former Portugal colonies 
(provinces) in the Africa continent through costly army conflicts, led increasing its military 
and administrative spends; with a lot of dead people that led suffered dissent and social 
discontent, included some international punitive sanctions, with undoubtedly adverse impact 
in its public financial accounts. So, the boom associated with the Euro introduction, interest 
rate falling and private demand increasing period was short, losing competitiveness quicker 
than other periphery countries, with poor log-term growth prospect
38
.  
Graph N
o
 4.5: General Government Deficit/Surplus (% GDP) 
 
                         Source: European Commission-Eurostat 
 
Even though Portugal was doing better efforts than Greece in order to control its 
public finances, as well as reaching “Maastricht Treaty” indicators, it is unclear if really they 
(and other governments) reached reduction in their Public Debt in the first years of Euro 
currency introduction because there were some allegations of corruption and false public 
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 Ali, Shimelse (2010). Portugal´s Growth Challenge. Paradigm Lost: The Euro in Crisis. 
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information in some periphery countries, especially in the case of Greece. For instance, the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis began on October 2009, after announcing corruption 
behavior of the Greek First Minister George Papandreou at the Parliament; who said that the 
former government had been hidden real official information about its large Public Debt and 
Government Spending
39
. It is fair to point out that the former Portugal First Minister was 
unable to prevent when the first symptoms of crisis appeared in 2005; later they required 
financial assistance from International Monetary Fund and European Commission. 
Regarding the case of Greece that historically has maintained compelling Public Debt 
problems, especially under having abundant access to cheap capital by joining to the Euro-
zone in 2002, fueled by flush capital markets and increased investor confidence, “there are 
several deeply entrenched features that created conditions for underlying the current financial 
crisis, chiefs among these are pervasive state control of the economy, a large and inefficient 
public administration, increased endemic tax evasion and reduce revenue to financing public 
spends; furthermore, government in this country has been very generous with public workers 
increasing their salaries and pensions and widespread political clientelism” (Nelson and other, 
2010). Moreover, according to journalist comments Greek government (and Italy) was using 
sophisticated financial instruments to mask their Fiscal imbalances, supported by specialists 
linked with international private financial agencies, this a political irresponsibility. Later the 
four principal commercial banks
40
 have been received financial support from the European 
Financial Stability Facility Fund as a clear example of externalization of the cost risk. 
In the case of Spain, its high Public Debt has been caused basically by financial 
private sector, not by the public sector, the Debt is basically private, triggering the bubble of 
price in the real state. In this way, the Fiscal Deficits in these countries have been an 
indication that their governments have been profligacy in maintaining sustainable Finance 
accounts, especially in the last 2000 years (Table N
o
 3.1). As some authors pointed out, the 
behavior of the Public Debt-GDP ratio is one gauge of what is happening with the 
government finances, because of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a rough measure of the 
government´s tax base. A declining of Public Debt-GDP ratio can suggest that the 
                                                          
39
 Claessens, Stinj and others 2011.    
40
 National Bank, Alpha, Eurobank and Piraeus Bank on May, 2012 received US$ 22.5 billion, after losing 
around US$ 28 billion in the re-scheduling of Greek debt in March. 
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government is living within its means, for example, in the case of Germany (see Graph N
o
 
5.6); on contrary, a rising like in Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece
41
 means that the 
government indebtedness is increasing relative its ability to raise tax revenue (Mankiw, 2001), 
as we can see in the Table N
o
 4.2. 
In Table N
o 
4.3 and Graph N
o
 4.6, we can see how the total Central Government Debt 
of these countries have been increasing in the 2000s, Greece and Portugal have been financed 
their spending with the support of domestic and external creditors, because their domestic 
Gross Saving rates have been small and decreasing, reaching in average only rates of 7.97 and 
11.30 percent of GDP in the last 2006-10s, see Table N
o
 4.4. Consequently, residents 
(government and private sectors) have resorted to borrowing from abroad creditors to finance 
their domestic investment and imports in the international markets, as we can see in the 
Current Account Deficit evaluation, Table N
o
 4.5 and Graph N
o
 4.7. Making downgrading the 
Government Debts documents status in some European countries by some grading agencies
42
. 
For instance, “in the 2000s Greece had abundant access to cheap capital, fueled by flush 
capital markets and increased investor confidence after adopting the Euro in 2001, but 
unfortunately these capital inflows were not used to increase the competitiveness of the 
economy”43, neither to invest in tradable sectors; they were used to finance current spending 
of the government and finance real sector state projects.  
Table N
o
 4.3: Simple Annual Average of Central Government Debt, Total (% GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
                                                          
41
 February 2012 Greek government approved to reduce spends € 300 million in pension cuts, 22 percent 
reduction in the minimum wage and cut the state sector workforce in 150,000 people by 2015. This cut was 
needed to secure € 130 billon second package of aid from Euro-zone finance ministers. 
42 
The three most important International Agencies are Moody's, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor's. 
43
 Nelson, and other (2011). Greece Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications.  
1995-99 2000-04 2005-09
BELGIUM 118.62 100.13 87.57
FRANCE 60.78 64.47 72.40
GREECE 109.17 125.61 129.03
IRELAND 55.03 35.51 41.55
ITALY 127.06 115.23 110.87
PORTUGAL 60.95 62.71 72.96
SPAIN 63.92 52.39 36.59
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The increasing of the Public Debts in these countries have been through the emission 
of different modern and sophisticated financial instruments, of course we are coming from a 
world where financial innovation has been profoundly. It seems that it could not harm 
sometimes, hence should command a favorable predisposition from financial regulators in 
approval terms; which in turn led to be European countries almost impossible to repaying 
their increasing Public Debts obligations without bailout operations or the financial support 
from third parties such as European Central Bank (ECB) and/or International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), creating later a special fund called “European Financial Stability Facility” in May 
2010. Let us not forget that one of the major benefits of joining Euro-zone was have access to 
greater liquidity and a lower cost of capital; therefore, for high indebted countries such Italy, 
Greece
44
, Portugal, Spain and Belgium this means that they could borrow larger amounts at 
longer maturities and lower prices in “domestic currency”45. 
In spite of creating European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) funded with € 750 
billons, to support Sovereign Debt Crisis and reach financial stability around Euro-zone states 
by providing financial assistance
46
, the problems in these countries still without getting 
helpful solutions. So, later in October 2011, and February 2012, the Finance Ministers of the 
Euro region have joined in order to strengthen the EFSF fund, increasing it in € 1 Trillion to 
bolster financial situation of members especially Greece and Portugal. Furthermore, they were 
agreed to create Fiscal Union with strict fiscal rules, according to technical  recommendations 
of specialists from different countries, with the aim to reduce concerns related investors about 
the ability of a country to implement fiscal consolidation
47
; however, the current situation in 
the EMU shows us that while in the North (core) sub region countries are seem to 
convergence in terms of Deficit and Public Debt levels, in the periphery PIIGS the reality is 
very different between countries (at the same time, between these two economic European 
sub blocks). 
Graph N
o
 4.6: Central Government Debt, Total (% of GDP) 
 
                                                          
44
 Italy did a better job than Greece of managing its fiscal affairs during the crisis, however its Public Debt as a 
percentage of the GDP is still higher than that of Greece (Dadush and Eidelman, 2010) 
45
 Jones, Erick (2011). “The Euro and the Financial Crisis”. 
46
 For instance, recapitalize Banks or buying Sovereign Debt. 
47
 Rummel, Ole (2012). The Sovereign Debt Crisis: How to severe are the Challenges? 
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                                              Source: World Bank 
 
4.5.- Compelling Behavior of Savings, Investment and External Imbalances 
Regarding the Gross National Savings, if we make an assessment in the last two 
decades in blocks of five years (lustrums), we can notice more precisely its decreasing in 
these countries in the 2000s. We can see that Greece has been the most profligacy country 
regarding its Saving rate, since having acceptable more that 20 percent of its GDP in 1990s as 
a National Saving rate, this country ends up in average with less than 8 percent in the last 
2000s. In the case of Portugal which in the first half of the 1990 decade had more that 22 
percent of its GDP as Gross National Saving by the end of the first 2000 decade, ends up with 
around 11 percent in average between 2006 and 2010.  
Undoubtedly, both reductions have been as a consequence of the facilities for the easy 
access to foreign credits and reduction of the interest rate in the 2000s by joining to the Euro-
zone and the long run unsustainable welfare state policies; which in turn disincentive 
economic agents making efforts to save money. This compelling situation means that 
especially both countries had not been prepared to finance their domestic investment (public 
and private) and improvements of productivity and competitiveness, as well as deal with 
external and financial crisis. On contrary, they have been requiring high external financing 
through negative Net Foreign Investment (NFI), accumulating Current Account Deficits and 
huge External liabilities, as we can see in the Table N
o
 3.5 and Graph N
o
 3.7, regarding core 
countries (Germany).  
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Table N
o
 4.4: Simple Annual Average of Gross National Saving (% GDP) 
 
 
                                                            Source: World Bank 
 
In this way, another relevant analysis to assess the possibility of financial crisis in 
advance is the Current Account of Balance of Payments (BoP), whose annual Deficits have 
been compelling increased in the first decade of 2000s, see Graph N
o
 3.7. Of course, the 
highest annual average rate increasing precisely in Greece, from 6.79 to 12.47 percent of the 
GDP (5.68 percent of increasing), the focus of the crisis, followed by Spain (3.05 percent of 
increasing), Ireland (2.28 percent of increasing), Portugal (2.14 percent of increasing) and 
Italy (1.72 percent of increasing in their Deficits), between the first and the second lustrums 
of 2000s. According to the Warning Alert System (Zhuan and Dowling, 2002) estimated for 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the Current Account and Capital Account (of the Balance of 
Payments) indicators are on average more reliable than other types of indicators in assessing 
vulnerability and increasing of the risk to financial crisis. Besides, according to my previous 
assessment about former financial crisis in developing world, it said that Current Account 
Deficit (BoP) has been presented in all of them (Briceño, 2003). 
Also it is fair to point out that in the case of the United States of America the annual 
average of the Current Account Deficit is almost similar between these two 2000´s sub-
periods (lustrums), maybe because of the fact that U.S.A. Dollar has been using as: (i) reserve 
currency (store of value), (ii) international mean of payments and (iii) unit of account for a 
long time; before being in force the Euro currency (1999). For example, in the international 
commerce of goods and services, remittances of migrant workers, international loans from 
multilateral and private financial institutions, Foreign Direct Investment, Official 
Development Assistance, among other international operations. Additionally, the highest 
1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-10
Belgium 24.68 23.86
France 21.75 20.56 19.88 19.30
Greece 22.08 17.15 14.32 7.97
Ireland 22.10 26.31 25.25 17.32
Italy 21.99 21.43 20.29 18.02
Portugal 22.35 20.35 16.86 11.30
Spain 22.02 22.46 22.99 20.25
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productivity in this industrialized country allows it gaining long run sustainability in this 
external indicator, while the reality in the Euro periphery countries is different. 
Table N
o
 4.5: Simple Annual Average of the Current Account Balance Deficit (BOP, % GDP) 
 
 
                          Source: World Bank  
 
Let us not forget that according to the sustainability related theory of this Current 
Account of Balance of Payments, it is possible that countries may have Deficits for some 
years to help them finance their imports of capital goods and technology, especially for the 
tradable sectors, as exporting industries (including their inputs), or/and imports of national 
substitute goods, but not always. Furthermore, healthy international finance´s countries need 
long run equilibrium on the external financial sector too. Indeed this kind of persistent Deficit 
in developed or industrialized European countries could be understood not only as a weak of 
one macro fundamentals as a result of the domestic demand increasing in no tradable sectors 
like the real state, but also as a part of the moral hazard problem resulted from having the 
possibility to issuing an international paying and reserve currency such as Dollars and Euros. 
So it is believed that countries became careless; especially, in the case of periphery Euro-zone 
since 2000
48
. 
Consequently, as showed Graph N
o
 3.7 these Current Accounts Balance becoming 
deficit in some countries, and other deepened their deficits, especially since 1999-2000 years 
(like a break point), with the introduction of the Euro. Likewise, it is not wonder that 
according to basic macroeconomic identities and the Theory of Gaps of Hollis Chenery 
(1966), there is a clear relation between the behavior of the three economic variables analyzed 
                                                          
48
 Let us not forget that when Europe introduced the Euro in 1999, most of the political leaders, 
economist and bankers, thought that the Euro would become a competitor of the U.S.A. Dollar as a 
reserve currency and the financial obligation denominated in Euros would be trusted as much as 
those in the United States. Cavallo, D. Yale University lecture, 2011. 
1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-10
Greece -1.31 -4.06 -6.79 -12.47
Ireland 2.12 1.22 -1.12 -3.40
Italy -0.02 1.53 -0.94 -2.66
Portugal -0.62 -7.03 -8.74 -10.88
Spain -1.95 -1.73 -4.66 -7.68
USA -1.07 -2.64 -4.82 -4.34
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before, such as the increasing of the Government Balance Deficit, low Gross National 
Savings and the high Current Account Deficits of these Euro zone periphery countries, which 
have been incurred and profound in 2000s. As we can see, since the components of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP:Y) are the Consumption (C), Investment (I), Government purchases 
(G), and Net Exports (NX), Exports less Imports (of goods and services), we can get the 
follow relation (economic identity). 
Graph N
o
 4.7: Current Account Balance (BOP, % GDP) 
 
 
                            Source: World Bank 
 
Y  =  C  +  I  +  G  +  XN,  which can be rewrite: 
Y  –  C  –  G  =  I  +  XN,  then, being  S  =  Y  –  C  –  G 
S  =  I  +  XN;  or  S  =  I  +  NFI 
 Which means that the Gross National Saving (S) must be enough with the aim to 
finance Domestic Investment (I) and Net Foreign Investment (NFI) equals the Net Exports 
(NX); however, because of especially in the cases of Greece and Portugal Domestic Savings 
(S) have been dramatic decreasing in the 2000s, the economic agents (Public and Private 
sectors) have been financing their investments (I) by negative NFI. This is equivalent to the 
Current Account Deficit (BoP), which in turn means a high accumulation of external 
liabilities (indebtedness) of those countries. Therefore, in the Graph N
o
 3.8, we can see how 
the gap between Domestic Investment and National Saving has been financed by 
accumulating of negative Net Foreign Investment in Greece. 
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Graph N
o
 4.8: Greek Gross National Saving (GNS), Gross Capital Formation (GKF) 
and Current Account Deficit (CAD) as % GDP 
 
 
                   Sources: European Commission-Eurostat and World Bank  
 
In the Graph N
o
 4.8, we can see clearly the changes in this economy (Greece) after 
1999, the year of Euro introduction
49
, before Gross National Saving (GNS) and Domestic 
Investment or Gross Capital Formation (GKF) were very close; therefore, the negative Net 
Foreign Investment (NFI) or Current Account Deficit (CAD) was smaller. Later, after 2000, 
the National Savings rate has been fallen compelling because of the Government Budget 
Deficit (GBD) increasing, as well as in part because of the private saving felt too, deepening 
something which has been called by the economic literature as the “Twin” Deficits (GBD and 
CAD). Therefore, in these countries the difference between the decreasing in the Gross 
National Saving and the relative increase of the Domestic Investment has been financed by 
the larger negative Net Foreign Investment, indicating that foreigners were buying more 
assets in Greece than Greek investors were buying abroad with increasing financial costs. 
Greece was going into high Public and Private External Debts. 
In this way, foreign investors “get worried and became increasingly nervous that the 
Greek Government´s Debt was too big, and that it would default on its Debt, they started to 
demand higher interest rates for buying and holding Greek bonds, in order to compensate 
investors for the higher risk involved in holding Greek government bonds, but they also drove 
                                                          
49
 However, it is fair to point out that Greece joined Euro-zone recently in 2002. 
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up Greece´s borrowing costs, exacerbated its Debt levels, and caused Greece to veer towards 
default”50. Therefore, the market spread between the 10 years Greek´s bonds relative to 10 
years German´s bonds increasing since 2009 very quickly
51
, the cost of the Greek Debt has 
surged dramatically. At the same time financial institutions were adversely affected according 
with the implicit relationship between both variables, and also because of some of the 
financial institutions had been obtained a huge amount of public bonds. 
The case of Portugal is very similar Greece. It has been presented an increase in 
domestic spending accompanied by deteriorating of the Current Account Balance. The excess 
of Gross Capital Formation (GKF) or Domestic Investment has been financed not only with 
Gross National Saving (Domestic Savings) but also with accumulation of Current Account 
Deficits or negative Foreign External Investment since 1990s. Furthermore, between 1995 
and 2000 the private saving dropped around 7 percent, while the investment increased; 
consequently, the gap has been expanding, see Graph N
o
 4.9. In the 2000s, the GKF and the 
GNS have been reduced at the first time. However, the level of the first was higher, therefore 
the gap continued, especially due to the increasing of the General Government Deficit, 
according to the overspending related with the over bureaucratized civil service, unclear 
private-state partnership, which in turn fueled investment bubbles, etc. Consequently, the 
Current Account Deficit was broader and soared around 10 percent of the GDP in the second 
lustrum of 2000, which has been financed by costly external borrowings. 
Graph N
o
 4.9: Portuguese Gross National Saving (GNS), Gross Capital Formation 
(GKF) and Current Account Deficit (CAD) as % GDP 
 
                                                          
50
 Greece Debt Crises: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications.   
51
 Unfortunately, the situation for the follow years is even more complicated, so for 2012 Greek economy is 
felling around 5 percent, entering in recession according to Greek Governador of Central Bank Yorgos 
Provópulos. 
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                   Source: European Commission-Eurostat and World Bank 
 
4.6.- Other causes 
Another similar cause presented in the Europe Sovereign Debt Crisis, United States of 
America mortgage crisis and other financial crises has been the boom in the Real State sector 
supported irresponsible by the government, creating a bubble asset price; which for instance, 
after breaking in the USA in 2007 became the financial crisis. Consequently, the felt down of 
the asset prices and break up the bubble has been one of the main factors in the current 
financial crisis in developed countries (Allen and Carletti, 2009). It is also fair to point out 
that the dramatic artificially increased of the house prices index was presented in other 
European countries like Spain, Ireland, Iceland and United Kingdom.  
For some authors, this situation could be seen as a result of the low interest rate policy 
adopted by the U.S.A. Federal Reserve and other Central Banks, after the collapsing of the 
technology stock bubble by the end of 1990s
52
. In this way, the situation in Spain was more 
dramatic, construction sector value-added reached 17 percent of GDP, in ten years the 
Spanish housing prices more than doubled, reached a peak in 2006, the country started more 
homes than the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy combined (Dadush and 
Eildeman, 2010). The boom in this non trade sector led Spain increases the wages higher than 
other EU country, contributed to weak its productivity and loos of competitiveness.  
                                                          
52 
Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Greenlaw et al. (2008) and Taylor (2008). Cited in Allen and 
Carletti, 2009. 
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V.- CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As in previous financial crisis in developing countries caused by absence of suitable 
financial regulation and implicit guarantees of the governments for financial institutions, the 
origins of the current financial crises is in maintaining implicit and explicit government 
guarantees for some private financial institutions (banks) without deductibles. This creates a 
vicious circle between Banking and Sovereign Debt Crises amid irresponsible political 
indecisions, which in turn originate moral hazard behavior with overexposure to private 
credit default, irresponsible private borrowers, over expenditure, awkward and risky 
investments and consequently assets price bubble, accumulation of large deficits in the 
Current Account of Balance of Payments, among other disequilibrium. 
Financial crisis in developing countries were originated because of the fact that 
governments had been inconsistently keeping over valuated Fixed Exchange Rates for a long 
time; consequently, their Real Exchange Rates were over valuated, loosing competitiveness, 
damaging the international commercial sectors (exporting) and creating real state bubble and 
high Deficit in the Current Account (BoP). These facts have been presented again in the 
currently international financial crises, for some EU countries the Euro currency is very over 
valuated. 
Periphery EU countries and the core have had serious problems to reconciling 
asymmetric monetary, fiscal and external needs, their efforts in order to prevent excessive 
Public Debt and avoid financial bailout were unsuccessful. Consequently, these problems 
have been reducing the attractiveness of the Euro currency as an alternative (i) reserve asset, 
as well as a (ii) medium of exchange and/or (iii) unit of account in the international 
transactions. So, in the next years the U.S.A. Dollar will continue being the dominant foreign 
currency, preferred for global transaction and reserve asset. It has been estimated that around 
85 percent of the Foreign Exchange transactions, 60 percent of the official Foreign Exchange 
Reserve and the half of the Foreign Securities will be denominated in U.S.A Dollars (Glick, 
2012). 
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Because of moral hazard behavior has been one of the main factors in most of the 
financial crisis, it is important to come up with the explicit prohibition for the Central Banks 
to rescue or bailout directly and discretionally commercial financial institutions without 
appropriate deductibles and credible punishments with the aim to internalize the risk cost. It is 
known the world over that in the past hyperinflation processes mainly were originated by 
monetary financing from Central Banks emissions toward Central Governments 
(monetization of Fiscal Deficits). After that, governments progressed under the explicit 
prohibition to finance government budgets in the primary financial markets by the Central 
banks, at the same time hyperinflation has been disappeared. Moreover, governments (Central 
Banks) around the world should not expect that the credit rating international agencies 
(Moody´s, Standard and Poor´s and Fitch IBCA) evaluate their financial situation; as well as 
it is important to prevent mistakes by the efforts of more transparent public institutions like 
Central Banks, Financial Regulators and Finance Ministries. 
In order to mitigate possibilities of future financial crisis around the world, especially 
in developing countries, it is very important that Micro and Macro Prudential Regulations 
have been institutionalized, according to intrinsic problems in international financial markets 
and the high volatility of capital inflows toward developing countries affected by global 
factors (especially, in the case of Short-term Capital flows) and domestic factors (especially, 
in the case of Long-term Capital flows). These economic policy tools have proved been 
effectively in order to avoid high volatility of capital inflows in emerging markets in the last 
years; furthermore, the grade of implementation should be according to the financial 
instruments that the countries are dealing with, such as financial derivatives as well as the 
participation of Short-term Capital inflows.  
 Another important lesson for policymakers is one trivial, developing countries and 
small countries with open capital accounts need Float Exchange Rates. It is not convenient 
establishing hard fixing or attaching local currency to the Euro or U.S.$., because these 
episodes have been proved overvaluations, losing of competitiveness and reducing of the 
trade activities and the Gross Domestic Product. Like nowadays in the cases of Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania which currencies were attached to the Euro. Last but not least, it is very 
important to keep up with legally independent and technical Central Banks, far from politician 
influences, increasing their accountability and reduce their discretionarily intervention.  
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Finally, in these financial crises have existed weak fundamental problems such as 
imbalances in the Public and External sectors caused by Government Spending, Fiscal Deficit 
and/or the Public Debt, reduction of the Domestic Saving; consequently, the Deficit in the 
Current Account of the Balance of Payments has been increasing with reduction of Foreign 
Exchange Reserve. This has been especially happened as a consequence of the EMU and Euro 
currency introduction as a competitor of the US$, that caused a reduction of the interest rate 
and the availability of huge fresh capitals for their members, bolstering moral hazard 
behavior of economic agents externalized their risk costs and investing in unprofitable and 
nontrade sectors loosing competitiveness their economies.  
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ANNEX: EUROZONE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS 
 
This annex presents official statistics that show the behavior of economic agents in the 
periphery Euro-zone countries, government and private sectors, especially from those 
countries which have been more affected by the Sovereign Debt Crisis so- called PIIGS. 
Those statistics are related with General Government Deficit/Surplus, Public Debt (Central 
Government Debt), Gross National Savings and Investment, Current Account Deficit in the 
Balance of Payments and the Foreign Exchange Reserve. Definitely, the best predictors of 
financial crisis should be the high Government Debt (caused by increasing Fiscal Deficits 
accumulation), the increase of the Current Account Deficit and the reduction of Foreign 
Exchange Reserve.  
 
Table N
o
 1.A: General Government Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP) 
 
      Source: European Commission-Eurostat 
 
 
Table N
o
 1.B: General Government Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP) 
 
     Source: European Commission-Eurostat  
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium -0.10 -0.30 -2.70 0.10 -0.30 -1.30 -5.80 -4.10
France -4.10 -3.60 -2.90 -2.30 -2.70 -3.30 -7.50 -7.10
Greece -5.60 -7.50 -5.20 -5.70 -6.50 -9.80 -15.80 -10.60
Ireland 0.40 1.40 1.70 2.90 0.10 -7.30 -14.20 -31.30
Italy -3.60 -3.50 -4.40 -3.40 -1.60 -2.70 -5.40 -4.60
Portugal -3.00 -3.40 -5.90 -4.10 -3.10 -3.60 -10.10 -9.80
Spain -0.30 -0.10 1.30 2.40 1.90 -4.50 -11.20 -9.30
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Belgium -4.50 -4.00 -2.20 -0.90 -0.60 0.00 0.40 -0.10
France -5.50 -4.00 -3.30 -2.60 -1.80 -1.50 -1.50 -3.10
Greece : : : : : -3.70 -4.50 -4.80
Ireland -2.00 -0.10 1.10 2.40 2.70 4.70 0.90 -0.40
Italy -7.40 -7.00 -2.70 -2.70 -1.90 -0.80 -3.10 -3.10
Portugal -5.00 -4.50 -3.40 -3.50 -2.70 -2.90 -4.30 -2.90
Spain -7.20 -5.50 -4.00 -3.00 -1.20 -0.90 -0.50 -0.20
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Table N
o
 2.A: Central Government Debt, Total (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Bank  
 
 
Table N
o
 3.A: Gross National Saving (% GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
Table N
o
 3.B: Gross National Saving (% GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
BELGIUM 106,76 105,41 101,96 95,81 90,71 89,41 85,62 82,60 87,84 92,35
FRANCE 60,67 59,75 63,41 68,08 70,44 72,30 67,95 66,80 72,21 82,75
GREECE 123,91 126,70 127,70 123,17 126,55 132,88 127,11 123,25 123,43 138,47
IRELAND 40,03 36,87 34,78 33,58 32,29 32,70 28,91 28,40 48,56 69,21
ITALY 119,39 118,52 115,77 111,35 111,13 113,34 109,65 104,84 107,64 118,90
PORTUGAL 58,24 59,10 63,48 65,14 67,61 70,57 69,61 67,74 72,49 84,40
SPAIN 58,92 54,44 52,97 48,32 47,28 38,38 34,02 30,06 34,04 46,47
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium 24.54 24.28 25.09 24.81 25.48 26.34 24.54 20.09 22.86
France 21.12 19.75 19.24 19.81 19.47 20.37 20.91 20.37 17.41 17.47
Greece 15.14 13.03 15.67 15.46 12.28 12.86 10.10 7.23 5.04 4.63
Ireland 24.01 23.64 26.01 26.51 26.08 25.74 21.59 16.59 12.99 9.71
Italy 20.78 20.86 19.86 20.35 19.61 19.71 20.07 18.05 16.20 16.05
Portugal 17.75 18.03 17.80 16.56 14.17 12.97 13.20 10.95 9.64 9.75
Spain 22.42 23.36 23.81 22.95 22.39 22.28 21.26 19.66 19.21 18.82
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Belgium
France 19.76 19.33 18.29 18.33 18.85 18.74 19.77 20.90 21.86 21.53
Greece 21.99 20.69 19.83 20.61 19.06 18.62 19.21 16.29 14.49
Ireland 22.79 19.89 21.99 22.11 23.90 26.34 27.02 26.76 26.01 25.45
Italy 19.82 18.88 19.56 19.59 21.69 22.00 22.23 21.40 21.04 20.49
Portugal 24.29 24.45 21.95 20.75 23.61 20.72 20.79 21.47 20.49 18.26
Spain 21.88 20.07 19.94 19.45 22.07 21.67 22.51 22.77 22.80 22.56
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Table N
o
 3.C: Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
Table N
o
 3.D: Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
Table N
o
 4.A: Current Account Balance (BOP, % GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Belgium 21.15 19.16 19.40 20.87 21.91 22.44 22.88 24.01 19.88 20.19
France 19.56 18.59 18.46 19.22 19.97 20.86 21.96 21.95 19.10 19.35
Greece 25.15 24.18 26.53 24.40 21.40 24.22 25.69 23.68 18.31 16.19
Ireland 22.81 22.19 23.43 24.82 27.32 28.18 26.14 21.58 14.42 10.79
Portugal 27.79 25.82 23.56 24.06 23.63 23.13 22.83 23.15 19.92 18.99
Spain 26.35 26.63 27.38 28.28 29.48 30.98 30.98 29.09 24.42 22.99
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Belgium 21.68 21.44 20.82 20.89 20.68 20.54 20.99 21.21 21.42 22.58
France 20.87 19.24 16.82 17.65 17.91 17.03 16.83 18.16 18.81 19.89
Greece 25.27 22.60 21.51 20.27 19.99 20.92 21.23 22.58 23.83 25.28
Ireland 18.99 16.06 14.94 15.94 18.22 19.71 21.43 23.33 23.74 24.06
Portugal 25.56 24.77 21.99 22.79 24.02 24.24 26.29 28.18 28.78 28.50
Spain 25.30 23.40 20.87 21.05 21.90 21.70 22.06 23.45 25.12 26.28
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Greece -7.24 -6.56 -6.64 -5.91 -7.59 -11.28 -14.62 -15.04 -11.16 -10.26
Ireland -0.65 -0.89 0.06 -0.58 -3.52 -3.51 -5.33 -5.80 -2.82 0.46
Italy -0.06 -0.76 -1.28 -0.95 -1.67 -2.55 -2.42 -2.87 -1.93 -3.49
Portugal -10.31 -8.21 -6.47 -8.36 -10.33 -10.67 -10.15 -12.64 -10.93 -10.00
Spain -3.95 -3.24 -3.50 -5.25 -7.38 -8.98 -10.02 -9.69 -5.14 -4.57
USA -3.88 -4.32 -4.68 -5.32 -5.93 -6.00 -5.08 -4.74 -2.68 -3.23
- 48 - 
 
 
 
Table N
o
 4.B: Current Account Balance (BOP, % GDP) 
 
   Source: World Bank 
 
 
Table N
o
 5.A: Total Foreign Exchange Reserves in Months of Imports (2000-09) 
  
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
 
Table N
o
 5.B: Total Foreign Exchange Reserves in Months of Imports (1990-99) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Greece -1.57 -1.93 -0.72 -0.13 -2.19 -3.30 -3.61 0.00 -5.48 -7.89
Ireland 0.59 1.12 3.47 2.85 2.57 2.77 2.30 1.15 0.25 -0.37
Italy -2.05 -2.30 0.76 1.25 2.22 3.16 2.70 1.63 0.67 -0.52
Portugal -0.81 -0.17 0.25 -2.23 -0.11 -4.05 -5.73 -6.82 -8.14 -10.39
Spain -3.53 -3.52 -1.14 -1.24 -0.33 -0.36 -0.14 -1.21 -2.93 -3.99
USA 0.05 -0.82 -1.29 -1.74 -1.55 -1.61 -1.70 -2.46 -3.24 -4.21
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
USA 0.87 0.96 1.15 1.23 1.08 0.92 0.93 1.08 1.11 2.01
Greece 3.86 1.67 2.54 1.22 0.46 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.64
Portugal 3.14 3.24 3.80 2.34 1.75 1.45 1.17 1.15 1.04 1.80
Ireland 0.54 0.52 0.46 0.30 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.09
Italy 1.68 1.65 1.85 1.77 1.51 1.46 1.47 1.54 1.54 2.54
Spain 2.02 1.88 2.07 1.11 0.66 0.50 0.47 0.38 0.37 0.71
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
USA 2.74 2.60 2.31 2.40 2.06 1.96 1.66 1.26 1.29 1.08
Greece 2.62 3.44 2.98 5.10 8.35 6.98 7.78 5.76 5.96
Portugal 8.63 10.54 8.66 8.37 7.38 6.07 5.61 5.25 5.08 3.20
Ireland 1.96 2.14 1.16 2.05 1.80 1.93 1.65 1.15 0.94 0.59
Italy 4.21 3.39 2.08 2.70 2.74 2.43 2.73 2.85 1.94 1.66
Spain 6.12 6.96 4.43 5.08 4.59 3.15 4.56 5.16 3.91 2.26
